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1. The trouble with Copernicanism 
DEAR READER. It is not impossible that certain rumors surrounding Robert Westman’s ‘big book’ 
have preceded your actual experiences with it. For instance, you may have been told how Westman 
claims that astrology explains the rise of Copernicanism. Such a presentation of The Copernican 
Question (2011, henceforth CQ) may explain why our author revised his perspective in the course of 
writing the book (cf. p. xvi), but it does not explain why it had to be written in the first place. 
If nothing else, CQ argues that the very notion of “Copernicanism”, as the protagonist of narratives 
about early modern astronomy (and early modern science in general), just isn’t very helpful. This, I 
believe, is a very important point to make, even if Westman’s own narrative doesn’t always make 
this sufficiently clear. Accordingly, let us begin with ‘the trouble with Copernicanism’.  
The introduction to CQ strongly emphasizes the importance of Thomas Kuhn’s classic The Copernican 
Revolution (1957, henceforth CR) in shaping a narrative template for stories about Copernicanism. 
According to this narrative, “Copernicanism” is primarily a phenomenon of “theoretical illumination 
or breakthrough” on the level of what one might call ‘cosmological convictions’ (i.e., guiding images 
of what the universe is like). Such “discovery” is then followed by “diffusion, reception, and 
assimilation” while facing “obdurate resistance” (CQ, p. 3b). 
The most interesting aspect of this narrative, in my opinion, is not so much its influence or impact, as 
the fact that it is not really historical at all. Instead, Kuhn provided a story which basically identified 
the earliest members of a contemporary scientific community through their adherence to 
heliocentrism, and which recounted how this novel social body gradually expanded and overcame 
theoretical difficulties. Such celebratory narratives were hardly new in 1957, with their strong debts 
to the 19th-century approach to historiography as providing a gallery of the dearly departed for the 
grateful living. As Westman rightly points out, Kuhn’s main innovation lay in his different evaluation 
of what constitutes a scientific community in the first place: not so much its privileged relation to an 
absolute truth, as its adherence to heuristically fruitful theoretical frameworks (CQ, p. 3b). 
Despite his farewell to a correspondence theory of truth, Kuhn clearly understood this fruitfulness 
not so much as opening up new possibilities in specific domains of scientific endeavour, bur rather in 
the stronger sense of imposing new necessities on adherents to such frameworks. Taking the 
Copernican picture of the world seriously, Kuhn seemed to assume, was to enter a situation in which 
it became impossible to take traditional Aristotelian physics seriously. This assumption explains 
Kuhn’s remarkable treatment of Tycho Brahe’s relation to the 1572 new star. In CR, the 1572 nova 
essentially played the role of a deus ex machina which weakened the credibility of Aristotelian 
natural philosophy by virtue of being superlunary. Certainly, it was the pesky Tycho Brahe who 
actually brought the message that “the basic contrast between the superlunary region and the 
corruptible earth was in question”, but for Kuhn, this simply meant that Tycho was actually already 
working for “the success of Copernicanism”, to which “the Aristotelian cosmological tradition” was 
“the principal barrier”. Putting it clearly and succinctly, Kuhn claimed that “any break with the 
tradition worked for the Copernicans (…)” (pp. 206-7) – even when it was carried out by an “anti-
Copernican” like Brahe (p. 209). 
This reminder makes it all the more apparent how, long before CQ, Westman’s earlier papers and 
books already managed to change historical narratives about early modern astronomy and science. 
More than anybody else, it is Westman who shaped the current situation in which finding an 
academic textbook on the Scientific Revolution which upholds the Kuhnian sense of a necessitated 
Copernican ‘revolution’, has become virtually impossible. Consider John Henry’s fine The Scientific 
Revolution and the Origins of Modern Science. Referencing a famous 1980 paper by Westman, Henry 
writes that “Copernicus must still be regarded as a radical innovator in astronomy, and as one of the 
prime movers in the formation of a new role for the astronomer – as a natural philosopher” (ed. 
2002, p. 17).  
The narrative focus here is still on a phenomenon which one could call “Copernicanism”, and to this 
extent, one could still argue that these narratives are not so much historiographies, as parables of 
modern scientific life and its ideals. The meaning of “Copernicanism”, however, is now very different 
from what was the case in 1957. It no longer stands for an almost fateful adherence to new 
‘cosmological’ doctrine, but rather for the phenomenon of Copernican astronomers “encroaching (…) 
upon the territory of natural philosophy” (ed. 2002, pp. 19-20), in the strict sense of proposing 
alternative doctrine about reality. “Copernicanism”, then, is not so much a phenomenon in the 
history of scientific doctrine, but rather a social and psychological phenomenon (which, as I 
emphasized before, is not precisely the same as a historical phenomenon). 
More specifically, the central core of “Copernicanism” appears to be identified with (1) stubborn 
human resistance to external forces of authority and disciplining (a resistance which is already 
symbolised in the very act of taking the Copernican system seriously as a representation of reality), 
and (2) a positive, non-necessary desire to claim both a voice and a name in other, more prestigious 
socio-disciplinary domains. If there is a suprahuman historical movement at work here, it is one of 
the carving out of an autonomous scientific community as such (i.e., free from external authority and 
disciplining). 
Such broad historiographical shifts are not only apparent in the densely populated realm of 
undergraduate textbooks. They also manifested themselves in the rare examples of grand narratives 
about early modern Copernicanism between CR and CQ. Rienk Vermij’s exceptional The Calvinist 
Copernicans, for instance, ended as follows: 
“Judging from the Dutch evidence, the position of the Copernican system during the scientific 
revolution was that of an icon, a rallying-cry, a point of reference, or even a shibboleth. The 
various arguments for or against proved less important than its simple presence as an ideal, a 
challenge to traditional learning or a symbol of the new. It does not seem that the many 
discussions centred on the subject had in themselves an important impact on the development 
of the new learning” (p. 375). 
Contrary to what obtained in these earlier narratives, CQ introduces the important difference of 
taking neither a scientific community nor the figure of “the Copernican astronomer” as its main 
protagonist, but rather ‘the Copernican question’ of its title.1 This question takes the form “Is the 
earth motionless at the center of a finite, star-studded sphere, or is it a planet moving in an annual 
circuit around the center?”, and is the source of historical change in two main ways. First of all, 
through the fact that, instead of being only brought up in order to be refuted (as was the case 
between the 13th and 15th centuries), such “alternative possibilities” (p. 1a) were now actively 
entertained or ignored. Secondly, the fact that this question was now raised and discussed in print, 
introduced important new possibilities as to the social regions which could encounter and 
appropriate the issue – or not. 
Of these two, it is the first which is most important here. It allows Westman to focus on the 
community of practitioners of “the science of the stars”: a defunct body of knowledge which 
comprised our astronomy and astrology, and which was usually practised in making predictions of 
the future by inspecting (representations of) the visible heavens (chapter 1). More specifically, 
Westman’s narrative privileges a handful of rari nantes who were drawn to the explanatory 
advantages of the Copernican ordering of the planets, and this –so Westman claims- out of a positive 
desire to fix astrology’s theological and/or natural-philosophical credibility, as well as its “chronic 
predictive difficulties” (p. 513).  
Such an approach turns CQ into a properly historical study. It is not difficult to read Westman’s 
narrative as if it speaks of gradual progress in a timeless scientific community towards a more 
recognisable notion of ‘astronomy’ and disciplinary constellations. But this overlooks the tremendous 
amount of emphasis which he gives to the fact that such shifts in “the astronomer’s role” were highly 
contingent and, more importantly, highly local. Indeed, one often gets the distinct sense that the 
main agent of trans-local migration of meanings in CQ is the amorphous presence called ‘print 
culture’ (cf. p. 17b), supplemented with letter exchange (pp. 361-2).  
If anything, Westman sets out to take the variable ways in which the Copernican question was 
handled and interpreted, as a prism through which to detect locally differentiated notions of a 
satisfactory ‘science of the stars’. The issue here is not so much whether there were “adherents of 
Copernicus”, but rather “what form their adherence took” (p. 311a). Likewise, a focus on the 
historical record as evidence of belief changes, gives way to a Certalian uptake of this record as 
evidence of appropriation or “ways in which historical agents used, adapted, and transformed” (p. 
21a). This prism also allows Westman to uncouple the Renaissance astronomer’s desire to alter 
customary disciplinary expectations and relations on the one hand, and his adherence to 
Copernicus’s proposal on the other (cf. p. 257b). 
2. The evolution of the Copernican question 
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 As early as 1994, Westman used the precise phrase “Copernican Question” in referring to the present book. In 
1986, however, Westman’s contribution to an edited volume by Ronald Numbers and David Lindberg still 
announced a forthcoming book called The Copernicans: Universities, Courts, and the Disciplines, 1543-1700. 
Despite the strongly anthropological and localising nature of Westman’s brand of historicism, there is 
also historiography here: that is, a proper story of “the evolution of the Copernican question” (p. 
394b; cf. p. 105b). This story stretches out over a “long sixteenth century” (p. 489b), and manifests 
ever more ambitious attempts to lay claim to the visible heavens as a ‘proper’ domain of explanation, 
and not just as a site where intimations of the future are given. Nevertheless, this evolution never 
quite separates itself from its origins in the celestial practitioner’s prognosticatory activities, which 
began to “monopolize the right to make prophecies” in the 1490s (p. 70a). 
In chapters 2 and 3, Westman’s story roughly begins by making a convincing case for the triple claim 
that (1) Copernicus’s Bologna period (1496-1500) socialized him into the prognosticator’s world of 
the ‘science of the stars’; (2) the publication of Giovanni Pico’s anti-astrological Disputations 
(Bologna, 1496) forcefully opened up a crisis for this discipline; (3) Copernicus actually referenced the 
Disputations in On the Revolutions, and therefore probably at least looked at it himself. On this basis, 
Westman claims that On the Revolutions should be seen as a response to a problematic of planetary 
order, rather than planetary modeling (p. 56b); more specifically, that it sought to save the credibility 
of astrology’s “core association of celestial causes and corresponding effects” (p. 87) by restoring its 
grounding in certainty about planetary ordering. This core problematic, solved by the ‘systemic’ 
properties of Copernicus’s ordering proposal, also determined Copernicus’s desire to have his 
celestial order be physically true, and this explains Copernicus’s ulterior move “to address the 
physical implications of the Earth’s motion” (p. 101b).  
The history of the Copernican question then moves into purgatory, as it were, due to its coinciding 
with the age of Protestant and Catholic confessionalisation. The two texts which publicized 
Copernicus’s proposal (On the Revolutions and Rheticus’s First Narration) were not only targeted at 
the community of celestial practitioners, but also conceived as tools of persuasion, designed to turn 
the possibility of credible astrological theoretical doctrine -offered by Copernicus’s reordering of the 
heavens- into a reality, and this in two religious communities (chapter 4). As tools of persuasion, both 
failed spectacularly, despite First Narration’s attempt to present Copernicus’s proposal as singularly 
apt at predicting the future, and despite On the Revolutions’s emulation of the tactics of the “popular 
verse prophecies” (p. 66) in addressing the Roman curia (chapters 5-7).  
As far as the Copernican question is concerned, this situation might very well have continued 
indefinitely. But the situation changed in the 1570s, and this due to the presence of another source 
of historical contingencies: nature.2 Beginning in chapter 8, Westman focuses on two events in the 
visible heavens (the sudden apperance of a nova in 1572, and of a comet in 1577) which deepened 
the challenge for the prognosticators: 
“The prognosticators no longer faced the customary question of predicting where the planets 
would be at certain times so that their influences could be engaged or avoided, but that of 
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 Cf. p. 19b: “What distinguished the period 1572-1604 was that the initial challenge [to the traditional 
distinction between incorruptible celestial heavens and a changeable terrestrial realm] originated from a 
nontextual, nonhuman source: natural events in the “out there” -believed by contemporaries to be divinely 
caused- actually impinged on the perceptual apparatus of those who claimed to have observed something 
new”. 
how to accommodate –and hence explain- celestial events that had not been anticipated and 
which did not recur” (p. 13b). 
Both events, Westman points out, rapidly became the subject of a separate literature, turning them 
into distinct public events “such as would not have been conceivable” outside print culture (p. 230b; 
also cf. p. 250b). For most prognosticators, the evident script for accommodating such 
unforeseeables was to activate “the traditionalist alliance” with theology by switching discourses, and 
situating the nova in a “long-term apocalyptic narrative” (ibidem). Very different, however, was a 
small minority of “Nullists”. These began to defend a clear-cut separation between Scripture and the 
visible heavens, and to deny the very possibility of encountering signs of the imminence of the 
Apocalypse in the latter legible surface. They also led the phenomenon to be “incorporated into the 
space of theoretical astronomy” on the strength of their parallax-measuring rather than 
prognosticatory skills: 
“A nova could be a portent, but only a stella nova could become a resource for contesting the 
Aristotelian proposition of celestial immutability. Such a claim to starhood rested on different 
calculational resources (...)” (p. 230b). 
Finally, as this quote underlines, they rejected the traditional incommensurability between the 
‘monstrous’ and the ‘ordinary’; a rejection which manifested itself in their very willingness to speak 
of the nova as a new star, and to organize “a new problematic – reconciling the extraordinary and 
the ordinary course of nature [my italics]” (p. 235b) in the name of God’s ordained power (pp. 242a, 
257b). 
It is against the background of this move that, for the very first time since 1543, we encounter a 
second generation of celestial practitioners who began “actively to engage the full text of On the 
Revolutions”, rather than reading it “solely as a tool of astrological prognostication” (p. 259). More 
specifically, the new tendency to treat ‘the heavens’ as a private map in which to “park” (p. 278) 
even the rarest celestial phenomenon, put yet another premium on the explanatory advantages of 
the Copernican system. Despite such unprecedented “occasions to theorize about the order of the 
planets”, the 1570s and 1580s “did nothing to create a new consensus. If anything, by the end of the 
decade there was even less agreement” (pp. 257-8).  
Westman then moves towards a final “third-generation response (...) in which physical questions 
pushed to the fore and clearly became dominant” (p. 358b). The first decade of the 17th century is 
characterised as the time of a “new temper” (p. 16a) and “of remarkably rapid transition”, in that 
there was a sudden “convergence of new modes of natural philosophizing with theoretical 
astronomy” (p. 374a). The novel self-evidence of an approach to astronomical theory from the angle 
of natural-philosophical issues is remarkable indeed; nevertheless, Westman stresses that this was 
hardly revolutionary, but a further development of the innovations of the 1580s and their “world-
system wars” (pp. 14b, 372a). 
Privileging Kepler and Galileo, Westman points out how both were still celestial practitioners 
providing astrological predictions (pp. 376-81). Nevertheless, the difference between the Protestant-
Melanchtonian and the post-Tridentine Catholic attitude to astrology manifested itself most clearly 
in that Galileo, “unlike Kepler, had nothing to say about astrological theory” (p. 354b). In this respect, 
Galileo’s early relation to Copernicus remains a phenomenon shrouded in mystery. Westman 
suggests that his early socialisation in local, Italian debates on the motion of the sublunary elements 
provided “the interpretive grid through which Galileo first read Copernicus” (p. 355a), and this due to 
its relevance for “a defense of the Earth’s motion”, as was already stipulated by the second-
generation Copernicans (p. 366a).  
Kepler could not have been more different: 
“Kepler’s project, already evident from his earliest years, was nothing less than a wholesale 
revision of the principles of the science of the stars – not merely theoretical astronomy (...) but 
practical astronomy and theoretical and practical astrology” (p. 14b).  
In each of these domains, Kepler was a prolific writer throughout the period 1596-1609, further 
redefining the astronomer’s role in at least three ways. First of all, he radicalised second-generation 
appropriations by approaching the Copernican ordering itself, rather than discrete events, as a 
symptom or ‘footprint’ of God’s ordained power (p. 316b). Secondly, Westman argues that by 1593, 
Kepler was already privileging questions of celestial motion in terms of immaterial forces which 
would also encompass astrological influence. Remarkably, Westman –following Louis Valcke- claims 
that Kepler’s notion of what constituted a credible physical grounding, had itself been shaped by his 
reading of Pico’s Disputations. Once again, we have a celestial practitioner seeking to buttress 
astrology against the Piconian onslaught, but now by borrowing from the critic’s own suggestions. 
This halfway position also shows up in Kepler’s conception of practical astrology, which he 
consistently contrasted with the world of ‘ordinary’ prognostication. Limiting the strength of celestial 
inclinations in favor of sublunary human freedom, Kepler was arguing for a situation in which: 
“Politics (...) should not be a monopoly of ordinary astrologers any more than a theology of the 
natural world should be the unique preserve of theologians” (p. 381b).  
Thirdly, Kepler represents a point where celestial practitioners ceased to invoke God as the mere 
locus of an ‘ordained power’ (whose contours could be inferred from extraordinary phenomena), but 
rather as a veritable guarantee of the possibility of collapsing the extraordinary “into the ordinary 
course of nature” (pp. 385b, 401b). This “naturalist turn”, in which the astronomer’s map of the 
heavens was used as a map of all things natural –and not just of all things historical- became widely 
practiced on the occasion of another nova appearing in 1604. All that was missing now, was a 
Copernican advancing permanent, rather than exceptional and temporary, novelties in the heavens 
to argue his case – which is exactly what Galileo began to do in Florence in 1610 (chapters 17-18).   
After all this, it should not surprise us to find that the chapter-long conclusion to CQ speaks neither of 
the triumph of Copernicanism, nor of wholesale belief change in the 17th century scientific 
community. Instead, Westman’s perspective is strictly limited to a phenomenon which he 
characterizes as “closure”; that is, “an end to questioning and criticism from competing alternatives”. 
Westman is wise enough to acknowledge that this (psychological?) situation of ‘absence of 
skepticism’ occurred “in different ways among different audiences” (p. 510). Nevertheless, he also 
makes the double claim that (1) the years 1610-12 marked the end of a thirty-year period “from 
which there would be no turning back” (pp. 426, 492), and that (2) Kepler and Galileo’s later 
publications: 
“(...) made possible a new sort of multifaceted, robust public debate from the 1620s to the 
1640s. (...) This phase of the debate was no longer dominated by prognosticators (...). The 
emergent voices were those of a new breed of natural philosophers, the likes of Descartes, 
Gassendi, Marin Mersenne, Hobbes and Wilkins. (...) they quickly subordinated the exclusively 
astronomical and astrological issues of the earlier period to questions of agreement with their 
own physical principles and issues of biblical compatibility. The period from the 1620s to the 
1640s was, in short, the moment when modernizing natural philosophers captured the 
Copernican question”. 
In a way, the end of the long sixteenth century also marked the end of the science of the stars as 
such. Not only did the new generation of modernizers “inhale” and appropriate many of the 
theoretical and empirical achievements of Kepler and Galileo (p. 497b); they also rejected traditional 
astrology in toto (p. 513b). Pierre Gassendi did not even countenance its post-Tridentine power to 
securely predict the future state of crops (pp. 496a), while Isaac Newton collapsed “heavenly 
influence and catastrophic import” into a few predictable, periodically returning comets (p. 512a). 
3. The future of The Copernican Question 
Robert Westman should be congratulated on having followed his “passion to get to the bottom”, 
rejecting “the sensible advice of friends to get on with my career and republish my earlier studies as 
a modestly amplified collection” (p. xv). Without a doubt, CQ is a landmark in what was already one 
of the most intensely studied topics in the history of science. As suggested at the beginning of this 
review, however, this judgment has even more to do with Westman’s methodological choices than 
with the content of its argument. 
Contemporary historians of science like to congratulate themselves on having abandoned strong ties 
to their colleagues in the hard sciences, and on having opened up a critical distance with respect to 
celebratory narratives, internalist/externalist dichotomies, and absolute boundaries between science 
and pseudo-science. While I largely concur with the accuracy of the second claim, I am much less 
convinced about the first. It is becoming increasingly apparent that the ‘technical’ and 
‘anthropological’ turns which have led us to focus on local knowledge practices, have simply 
exchanged a doctrinal for a technological definition of science (thus imitating what has happened in 
the hard sciences), and have done nothing to alter the traditional assumption that science is 
fundamentally universal and a-historical (since it will be encountered in any time and place which the 
historian of science chooses to visit). Under such circumstances, it should not surprise us that fewer 
and fewer professional historians of science feel the urge to tell ‘grand narratives’ and that when 
they do, the actual progress made over the past few decades turns out to be discouragingly small. 
CQ does nothing less than to try and develop a methodological perspective which can avoid such 
pitfalls, applied to one of the backbones of what is probably the prime grand narrative in the history 
of science: the Scientific Revolution. Taking a big step back from Robert Westman’s intimidatingly 
thick volume, I would say that this is not the story of a scientific doctrine, nor of the relation between 
different social institutions devoted to knowledge production. Instead, it seems to me that 
Westman’s story privileges a desire to lay claim to a proper domain, as this manifests itself in the 
discourse of the science of the stars. For Westman, this desire appears to be relative to a broader 
situation in which a (theological) power granting authority to ‘traditionalists’ in natural philosophy 
and mathematics, curtails such claims. Accordingly, this act of laying claim is not only a highly 
performative one, carried out in and through the act of defending an alternative planetary 
arrangement, but also one which increasingly uses this alternative as a metaphor around which to 
develop and voice a ‘proper’ theological and natural-philosophical position. It is precisely in this 
attempt to honor performativity and metaphor, I believe, that CQ carves out a highly significant and 
helpful difference with respect to more traditional social histories of science. 
At the same time, I agree with Westman’s conviction that “historical narratives, like the meanings we 
make of our lives, are always subject to revision and reinterpretation” (p. xv). On a few occasions, I 
found that such revisions could be the result of a second look at the relevant primary sources. For 
instance, I doubt whether the evidence supports Westman’s contention that Michael Mästlin “openly 
broke with Aristotle’s doctrine of celestial immutability” (p. 261b). Likewise, Westman’s translation 
of the prognosticator Avogario’s “extraordinarily revealing letter” to the duke of Ferrara (1479), 
completely erases Avogario’s explicit reference to God, “the supreme king” (p. 72b). 
This last point brings me to a second source of salutary future revisions: a more thorough and 
sustained attention to the proper concerns of Renaissance theology and astrology. As a historian 
who ventures into the history of science from the angle of early modern ‘religion’ and ‘magic’, it was 
readily apparent to me that Westman’s narrative was based on the exact opposite movement. As I 
have argued in a recent paper, early Renaissance prognostication was not about obtaining “secure 
knowledge of the future” (p. 171a) at all.3 Indeed, my initial reading of CQ saddled me with the 
impression that this narrative, at heart, is not really about astrology, but rather about a human desire 
to impose regularity on the behavior of the visible – thus obscuring astrology’s traditional concern 
with the passions and embodiment while crediting it with a proto-scientific obsession with 
‘knowledge’ and ‘certainty’. As far as I can tell, Westman’s portrait of Renaissance astrologers as 
monopolizing naturalists, laying claim to ever greater portions of the visible (and the invisible) while 
thriving on popular anxiety and uncertainty, is more agreeable with old standard narratives in the 
history of astrology and magic than with Renaissance astrological discourse. Equally dubious, I 
believe, is Westman’s frequent construal of the social group called ‘the theologians’ as primarily 
invested in the safeguarding of their authority, and attacking astrology to the extent that its 
ambitions with respect to human knowledge of the future undermined this authority (cf. p. 12b). 
One way in which to open up a future for CQ, then, is by paying more attention to past celestial 
practitioner’s own understandings of their lived relations to the visible heavens and to the invisible 
God of Israel (i.e., in Westman’s terms, to the divine potentia absoluta rather than potentia 
ordinata), while heeding the important methodological advances carved out in CQ. In doing so, I 
predict, historians will give extraordinary longevity and meaningfulness to the Copernican question. 
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 Cf. Steven Vanden Broecke, “The stars, the sublunary world, and the social body. On the specific rationality of 
early Renaissance prognostications”, forthcoming in: From Mash’allah to Kepler, eds. Charles Burnett & Dorian 
Greenbaum. 
